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Thorsten Hippe
Exploring the Abyss. 
The Financial Crisis of 2008 ff. as a Central Topic of 
Problem-Centered Social Science Education
The financial crisis of 2008 ff. and financial crises in general should be a central topic of social science educa-
tion because these crises are a recurrent and therefore structural feature of modern capitalism which has 
severe consequences for citizens’ quality of life. Hence, the citizenry should know how to prevent such devel-
opments which endanger its well-being in a massive way. Therefore, learners should understand the relation-
ship between the quality of people’s everyday lives and those economic institutions and political decisions 
which have led to the current mess. They should be enabled to critically evaluate the current misregulation 
of the financial sector and the economy in order to identify possible policy measures to prevent or at least to 
mitigate future crises. By educating (young) citizens in this way, the (future) general public can – as a neces-
sary counterweight to the lobbyism of the finance industry – exert more prudent political pressure which 
gives politicians a greater incentive to regulate the financial sector and the economy in a manner which is 
beneficial for the vast majority of the people instead of for a small elite. Two core concepts of the social 
sciences can be used to make the roots of the seemingly complex topic more understandable for learners: 
liability and inequality.
In 2008, the global economic system was shaken to its 
core by an unexpected financial crisis. After the bank-
ruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers, it 
even stood at the brink of collapse1. The credit chains, 
which are the steam engines of modern capitalism 
(Strobl 2010, forthcoming) were almost completely 
destroyed by deep mistrust, fear and bank runs like 
those during the Great Depression in the early 1930s. 
Indeed, the situation got so severe that many Western 
governments felt compelled to publicly reassure their 
citizens that the government would “guarantee” their 
savings accounts.
Fortunately, governments and central banks did 
not repeat the political mistakes made by their pre-
decessors at the beginning of the Great Depression 
80 years ago. This time, Keynesian emergency mea-
sures were passed immediately which at least prevent-
ed the worst, so that – not even two years after the 
Lehman bankruptcy – the financial crisis seems to be 
almost over today. Stock prices are on the rise again; 
economic growth seems to have been restored. Some 
countries like Germany even dare to talk about a “job 
miracle.” Which was initially feared to develop into a 
long-lasting depression as those in the 1930s, revealed 
itself as not much more than a (grave) recession which 
is part of the normal business cycle.
1.  The importance of the financial crisis for 
social science education
So why should one take up this issue as a subject of 
social science education? Hasn’t the response to the 
financial crisis shown that we – or to be more precise: 
our political representatives – have learned very well 
1 See http://vodpod.com/watch/2940946-video-geithner-econo-
my-stood-at-the-brink-of-collapse (04.05.2010)
out of history? Hasn’t their effective response to the 
financial crisis proved that we can rely on our political 
elites to handle complex matters for us? Why frighten 
and bother pupils and teachers with such complicated 
and intricate topics like these strange “toxic financial 
products” which in the end even leading bank manag-
ers themselves did not fully understand? Isn’t it more 
important to devote scarce teaching time to basic 
issues like the functioning of democracy and issues 
which have a direct relationship to the everyday lives 
of pupils (consumer education, conflict mediation, 
job search training, etc.)?
1.1  Financial crises have a massive impact on 
citizens’ quality of life
From my point of view, such an objection would be 
misleading. An important task of social science edu-
cation is to widen learners’ horizon beyond their im-
mediate personal interests and their private everyday 
environment (Klafki 1996, 166f.), so that issues con-
cerning the national, European and global citizenry 
come into view. As Ziehe (2004) argues2, the teacher 
has to be a kind of “cicerone” whose task is to stimu-
late pupils’ interest for life-worlds which are beyond 
pupils’ immediate concerns. For the quality of learners’ 
own life is not only dependent on their competence 
to get a nice job, to spend their income prudently and 
to live in harmonious social networks, etc. Their qual-
ity of life is also – as the financial crisis dramatically 
shows – dependent on the institutional frame, social 
conventions and the social structure of the society in 
which they live. Hence, as Mikl-Horke (2010) makes 
clear, “it does not suffice to spread practical skills in han-
2 See http://www.hibb.hamburg.de/index.php/article/detail/ 
3999 (12.05.2010)
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dling money, offering financial literacy to the masses... 
Financial knowledge must encompass a consideration for 
the larger effects of financial markets on society and on 
culture.” So learners should understand the relation-
ship between (the quality of) their everyday lives 
on the one hand and (alternative) political decisions 
which shape institutions, conventions and norms (f.e. 
those prevailing in the financial market) on the other 
hand, i.e. the direct and the indirect influence the lat-
ter has on the former.
Moreover, learners should not just understand how 
national, European and global societies function, but 
they should also be able to critically evaluate the 
current institutions, social structures and norms of 
these societies. This means that they should be able 
to develop an own opinion concerning the question 
of whether current institutions, structures and norms 
(f.e. those prevailing in financial markets) are condu-
cive to citizens’ quality of life. Of course, this opinion 
should not be based on arbitrary personal feelings 
and prejudices, but on sound criteria like human dig-
nity, justice, efficiency, legitimacy etc. as well as on 
scientific theories and empirical analyses. Thus, social 
science education should train learners’ competence 
to identify and call into question those current soci-
etal institutions, conventions and structures which 
may have a detrimental impact on citizens’ quality 
of life. Social science education should also consider 
political alternatives to current institutions, conven-
tions, and structures which may have the potential to 
further citizens’ quality of life. This does not mean 
that I expect educated citizens to build a “paradise 
on earth”, which is impossible. Rather, I just argue 
that citizens should be given a chance to know how 
they can at least mitigate the harmful effects of cur-
rent major societal problems (like f.e. global warming, 
terrorism, the financial crisis), i.e. to analyze which in-
dividual, communal and political actions can prevent 
these problems from turning their world (or parts of 
it) into a “hell”.
The financial crisis has forcefully shown how impor-
tant this competence is, because it demonstrates that 
citizens cannot uncritically rely on political and eco-
nomic elites to promote or even to protect public wel-
fare (see f.e. Müller 2010, who documents the failure 
of politicians to regulate and supervise the financial 
sector appropriately). So, every citizen should have 
a basic understanding of the huge dangers still hid-
den in the modern financial sector, which brought the 
world to the brink of an “abyss”, as German treasury 
secretary Steinbrück expressed it.
Rajan (2010, 213ff.) argues that the prevention of 
severe financial crises in the next decades requires 
more international macroeconomic coordination in 
order to reduce global economic imbalances between 
over-consuming countries (especially the US, the UK, 
and Spain) and under-consuming countries (espe-
cially Germany, Japan, and China). However, so his 
argument goes, politicians of each country acknowl-
edge the problem in secret conversations, but refuse 
responsibility and put the blame on other countries. 
Moreover, politicians are hardly willing to cede sover-
eignty to global organizations. Therefore Rajan (2010) 
recommends that international organizations like the 
International Monetary Fund should no longer appeal 
only to politicians but should try to educate coun-
tries’ citizens about the hidden fractures of the global 
economy (and other global problems) and the long-
term benefits of global macroeconomic coordination 
so that they put their politicians under pressure. He 
urges international organizations to “find ways to enter 
school and university classrooms, where students can be 
most receptive to ideas about global citizenship.”(ibidem, 
214). Thus, one important task of social science educa-
tion is to further students’ understanding of global 
economic challenges, so that they can create a public 
climate which puts politicians under pressure to be 
more responsive to the requirements of global eco-
nomic coordination.
1.2  Financial markets are highly susceptible 
to imbalances
An important didactic consequence of the financial 
crisis, as Öchs/Kappeler (2010) show, is to refuse to 
teach market capitalism as a system always tending 
towards equilibrium as in neoclassical economics. Of 
course, (regulated) markets often have very beneficial 
consequences, as f.e. the diverging economic develop-
ment in Western and Eastern Europe between 1949 
and 1989 shows. But unregulated markets – especially 
financial markets – equally often lead to the built-up 
of huge economic imbalances. These imbalances and 
their impact of citizens’ quality of life should be a cen-
tral issue of civic and economic education.
As Kindleberger (2005) and Reinhardt/Rogoff 
(2009) have shown, financial market imbalances, i.e. 
the syndrome of “financial manias, panics and crash-
es” is a not an unusual aberration, but a recurrent, 
i.e. structural, systemic feature of capitalism. Short 
human memories make it all too easy for such crises 
to recur. Time and again during the last eight cen-
turies, the built-up of enormous economic risks was 
justified by the optimistic “This-Time-Is-Different 
Syndrome” (Rein hardt/Rogoff 2009), i.e. euphoric 
overconfidence in jeopardous investments and ini-
tially skyrocketing asset prices. Thus, one important 
task of social science education is at least to make 
(young) citizens aware of the human propensity to 
“irrational exuberance” (Shiller 2000), i.e. to misjudge 
the elusiveness of “asset bubbles”, and the long-term 
consequences of those human failures. Therefore, 
social science education should – as Ötsch/Kappeler 
(2010) recommend – call into question the “naïve 
representationalism” (ibidem) of the neoclassic actor 
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concept3, i.e. the theoretical assumption that aver-
age human perception and judgment is free of grave 
systematic errors. However, it should also not be for-
gotten that governments often play an important 
role in encouraging those economic imbalances (Ra-
jan 2010).
1.3  The financial crisis is far from being over
The historical analyses of Kindleberger (2005) and Rein-
hardt/Rogoff (2009) mentioned above make clear that 
it would be ill-advised to proceed on the assumption 
that the near future will be free of grave financial cri-
ses. Such an assumption would be especially danger-
ous because it seems that national governments have 
– by financing the huge bail-outs of the banks and the 
Keynesian countermeasures in 2009 – shot their fiscal 
bolt for a long time to come. Government debt of all 
Western nations has risen significantly as a result of 
these countermeasures. Hence, it is rather doubtful 
whether our future governments will have the capac-
ity to spend our way out of such a crisis once again.
Some Western governments seem to be overbur-
dened to handle the crisis already today. At some point 
in time, with ever increasing government debts, finan-
cial markets (i.e. in this case the creditors of govern-
ments) can – may it be justified or not – become wary 
of their ability to pay off their loans and consequently 
refuse to lend money. In financial markets, those suspi-
cions tend to become self-fulfilling prophecies: if inves-
tors assume that a government (or other debtor) will 
probably not be able to serve its debt, interest rates 
soar, thereby making it more difficult (if not impos-
sible) for the government to get its debt under control. 
Moreover, the “herd instincts” of financial markets can 
be as euphoric as they can be nervous and panic-strick-
en. Thus, suspicion in financial markets may not only 
be self-fulfilling, but often also – may it be justified 
or not – highly contagious, i.e. may jump quite easily 
from one government (or other debtor) to another or 
from one asset category to another.
Just a few years ago, nobody ever thought that one 
of the rich Western countries would ever come near 
to the risk of sovereign default. However, the case of 
Greece’s quasi-insolvency in 2010 has already belied 
this expectation. Moreover, other countries with simi-
lar economic problems – a highly indebted private or 
public sector – like Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy 
(the so-called “PIIGS” countries) have become infect-
ed: “What we are seeing here is Europe’s equivalent of the 
US subprime crisis.”(Münchau 2010)
3 This is not to say that the neoclassic model of “homo oecono-
micus” is useless. But social science education should critically 
examine which social problems can be adequately analyzed 
with this concept (alone) and those which cannot. There are 
good reasons to think that the functioning of financial markets 
cannot be understood well with the concept of “homo oecono-
micus” alone (e.g. Akerlof/Shiller 2009).
However, the government debt crisis is not limited 
to continental Europe. Some experts do not hesitate 
to speak of a “non-negligible risk of sovereign default 
in the UK and the US”(Buiter 2009) as a long term con-
sequence of the financial crisis. Nouriel Roubini, one 
of the few economists who predicted the financial 
crisis of 2008, recently feared that “Greece is only the 
tip of the iceberg, or the canary in the coal mine for a 
much broader range of fiscal crises. Today it is Greece. 
Tomorrow it will be Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Iceland. 
Sooner or later Japan and the US will be at the core of 
the problem, shaking the global economy.”4 According 
to the historical analysis of Reinhardt/Rogoff (2009), 
financial crises in the private sector are often followed 
by public debt crises. Thus, the financial crisis is not 
“over”. Rather, it has been (partially) shifted from the 
private to the public sector.
1.4  The epicenter of the financial crisis has 
shifted to the EU
The huge rescue operation of the EU to “save the Euro” 
concluded on 9th may 2010 provides no reason to re-
voke this estimation. The bail-out is – hopefully – an 
emergency measure to prevent financial turmoil and 
to buy time but alone is far from being a sustainable 
solution to the structural problems of the Eurozone 
(Münchau 2010b; Tilford 2010; Wolf 2010).
Seen from the viewpoint of new institutional eco-
nomics, the rescue operation carries the risks of in-
creasing government debt in the mid-to-long-term 
(Boone/Johnson 2010): Why should politicians of 
(over)indebted European governments, who need the 
support of voters (most of whom reject tax increases 
and benefit cuts), take great pains to contain their 
debts if other EU countries have guaranteed to foot 
the bill for them and the ECB is ready to buy their (de 
facto) junk bonds? This is the important risk of “moral 
hazard”, which can lead to an “overgrazing of the fis-
cal commons”.
This is not to say that fiscal indiscipline is the sole 
cause of the huge government debts in some Europe-
an countries. The main part stems from the financial 
crisis (De Grauwe 2010). But fiscal indiscipline (and 
cheating) of governments in some European countries 
is also an important cause of the current problems. Of 
course, European politicians are promising now that 
discipline in public spending will be controlled by the 
EU (Ecofin and EU commission) and all will be good. 
However, the economic history of the Euro has shown 
that those “controls” can be all too easily circumvent-
ed (Goldman Sachs provides help5). The stability and 
growth pact was not much more than a paper tiger 
4 See http://gulfnews.com/business/opinion/us-faces-inflation-
or-default-1.622397 (6th may 2010)
5 See f.e. http://www.spiegel.de/international/
europe/0,1518,676634,00.html and (13th may 2010)
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(and not well constructed). Now, European monetary 
commissioner Olli Rehn (2010) is promising that in the 
future, all government budgets will be checked by Eu-
ropean Finance Ministers before they are concluded by 
national parliaments. In other words, European politi-
cians (finance ministers) are (once again) expected to 
control themselves. We have had something similar to 
that already before, and it failed. According to Burda/
Gerlach (2010), the EU rather needs to set up an in-
dependent institution to vet fiscal plans of Eurozone 
governments according to solid rules (which cannot 
be twisted by politicians afterwards) in order to make 
credible commitments instead of vague promises.
What is even more important, it is far from sure 
that the (promised) austerity measures are the right 
medicine for the economic problems of the “PIIGS”-
countries at all. Seen from a Keynesian perspective, 
massive budget cuts in time of recessions will (be-
sides provoking public unrest) probably only deepen 
the crisis, making it difficult to reduce public debt. If 
governments want to save more, someone else has 
to spend more money to keep the economy going 
(Horn et al. 2010; Marterbauer 2010). But in times of 
economic uncertainty, corporations are hesitant to in-
vest more and consumers are reluctant to spend more. 
So, if corporations or consumers do not spend more, 
budget cuts of the state only weaken economic de-
mand, which results in lower tax revenues and more 
unemployment, so that public debt is unlikely to be 
reduced. Thus, “an economy full of thrifty savers can-
not flourish for long because nobody can earn income 
if no one else spends money. We exalt frugality and exco-
riate borrowing, but in a vibrant economy, you cannot 
have one without the other.”(Rajan 2010, 203) This is an 
important, counterintuitive insight called “paradox 
of thrift”, which should be a central part of every so-
cial science curriculum, because it can be used to il-
lustrate the fallacy of composition and to show the 
limits of moralizing, i.e. the fact that private virtues 
can be public vices. By showing the often overlooked 
macroeconomic repercussions of microeconomic ac-
tions, the paradox of thrift can be used to undeceive 
the short-sighted, microeconomically restricted and 
moralizing common sense according to which the im-
moral state has “lived beyond its means” (German chan-
cellor Angela Merkel) and must only have the “moral 
willpower” to reduce its – morally bemoaned – debt 
in order to be able to do so. But if many – morally 
lauded – people want to save huge amounts of money, 
other actors have to take huge amounts of – morally 
bemoaned – debt. Otherwise, the economy is in a de-
pression. So, who is “immoral”? Who is “moral”? Who 
lives far below their means?
However, the structural problems of the eurozone 
go deeper (Scharpf 2010). They have to do with the 
question whether the political project of the Euro (in 
the current form) really made economic sense at the 
time it was concluded (Stiglitz 2010). Well-meant is not 
well-made. As some economists have criticized long 
before the euro was introduced (e.g. Feldstein 1997), 
it is doubtful whether the Eurozone is an optimum 
currency area (e.g. Krugman 2010a-c; Tilford 2010; 
Scharpf 2010), because it is an economically diverse 
area with strongly differing economic developments 
(especially differing wage increases and inflation) in 
its regions (e.g. Priewe 2007; Dullien, Schwarzer 2005). 
This is of great importance, because it creates consid-
erable economic challenges and risks. As the skepti-
cism of (f.e.) Paul Krugman shows, who considers the 
euro as “A Money Too Far”(Krugman 2010a), you do not 
have to be a nationalist enemy of European integra-
tion to raise that delicate issue (see also Stiglitz 2010; 
Williamson 2010; Scharpf 2010) which most European 
politicians did and do not want to hear, let alone dis-
cuss publicly because of ideological reasons.
Thus, the current EU crisis is by far not (only) a ques-
tion of “Greek culture” and the fiscal indiscipline of 
Greek’s government, as is often assumed. The prob-
lems of Portugal, Ireland and especially of Spain do 
not stem from public debt as such, but from an overin-
debted private sector in the wake of a gigantic housing 
boom and bust – exactly as in the US. The overindebt-
edness of the private sector in Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain threatens the solvency of their banking systems 
and thereby the solvency of their governments, which 
have guaranteed to cover up their banks’ losses. For 
example, in Spain, public debt stands at 53% of GDP – 
which is much less than German public debt –, while 
private debt in Spain stands at 178% of GDP (much 
worse than in the US, where private debt stands at 
100% of GDP).6
One central reason for the built-up of private over-
indebtedness in Ireland, Portugal and Spain lies in 
the construction of the euro-zone (Feldstein 1997; 
Scharpf 2010; Krugman 2010a-c; Stiglitz 2010; Tilford 
2010; Priewe 2007; Williamson 2010). A single nominal 
interest rate set by the European Central Bank (ECB) 
(which can only target EU average inflation because it 
cannot differentiate its interest rate) for an economi-
cally diverse area with different inflation rates (as is 
the Eurozone) creates the risk of strongly diverging 
real interest rates, so that the European wide nominal 
interest rate of the ECB is (was) too low for some coun-
tries (f.e. Spain) and too high for others (f.e. Germany) 
(see f.e. Scharpf 2010; Enderlein 2004; Heine, Herr 
2009, 205ff.). This gives rise to problematic economic 
developments, because diverging economic develop-
ments are even reinforced. Thus, the main reason for 
the mind-boggling housing boom in Spain in the last 
10-15 years and, as a result, the bust of that boom and 
Spains’ current economic woes (overindebtedness of 
6 See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4a327412-78b7-11df-a312-
00144feabdc0.html (26.06.2010)
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its private sector and high unemployment) is that the 
nominal interest rate set by the ECB was much too low 
for that countries’ economy at that time. The diverging 
real interest rates (together with cultural differences) 
reinforced already diverging inflation rates between 
southern EU countries like Spain (relatively high infla-
tion) and northern EU countries like Germany (low in-
flation), so that the competitiveness of the southern 
countries deteriorated strongly. Today, this massive 
loss of competitiveness is the decisive obstacle to re-
duce the high debt of the private sector (e.g. Spain) or 
of the public sector (e.g. Greece) in southern EU coun-
tries (Flassbeck, Spiecker 2010; Boone, Johnson 2010).
What is more, the euro has deactivated an impor-
tant former adjustment mechanism which would 
have helped the so-called “PIIGS”-countries (Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain) in the current situation: 
the devaluation of their currencies (Gloede, Menkhoff 
2010). By making their products erstwhile cheaper 
on the European market, this mechanism had made 
it much easier for them to overcome economic reces-
sions before the euro was introduced. But today, these 
countries are forced to cut wages and public spend-
ing instead. It is doubtful whether such measures 
will be successful instead of promoting a deflationary 
spiral in the EU (Tilford 2010). “All this is exactly what 
the euro-skeptics feared. Giving up the ability to adjust 
exchange rates, they warned, would invite future crises. 
And it has.”(Krugman 2010b)
Of course, an alternative to competitive deflation 
in southern EU countries may be to boost economic 
demand in northern European countries, first and 
foremost in Germany (Arestis, Horn 2010; Flassbeck, 
Horn, Dullien 2010; Flassbeck, Spiecker 2010; Posen 
2010; Tilford 2010) and to give up its extreme fixation 
on steadily accumulating huge export surpluses. In 
the long-term, a coordinated European wage policy 
oriented to productivity increases (Heine, Herr 2010, 
230; Flassbeck, Spiecker 2010; Blomert 2010) may be 
a measure to contain economic divergences and im-
balances. However, the majority of German political 
and economic elites deny even the possibility that 
their one-sided economic strategy may be one of the 
reasons for the current mess. A corresponding change 
would require a long-term transformation of the eco-
nomic culture of this country which would possibly 
have to be not much less radical than the long-term 
transformation which Greece is expected to perform 
(from the opposite direction, of course).
The consequence for social science education is to 
more openly evaluate and critically discuss the pros 
and cons of the current form of European integration 
and to consider possible political reforms instead of 
just depicting and analyzing the history and the insti-
tutions of the EU as is done in some textbooks (which 
is also a very boring way to teach). It is a misleading 
assumption to think that the task of European civic 
education would be to promote mere acceptance for 
the process of European integration among learners. 
The task of European social science education is not 
to educate uncritical European apple-shiner. Instead, 
the task is to promote a differentiated worldview, i.e. 
to openly evaluate and critically discuss major politi-
cal decisions of European integration with recourse 
to diverse scientific viewpoints (critical ones, too). It 
also means to lay bare the economic differences – and 
particularly the resulting tensions – between the Eu-
ropean countries and the considerable problems of 
economic coordination which these differences cre-
ate. Instead of creating the fiction of a “harmonious 
Europe”, the structural conflicts between the member 
countries – and possible solutions for them – have to 
be analyzed. This will also enable learners to become 
scientifically informed, critical citizens who can call 
into question one-sided, self-serving explanations 
put forward by European politicians for the current 
economic turmoil (“attack of speculators”). The edu-
cational goal should be a healthy suspicion towards 
European politicians and their actions. Then, some 
dimensions of European integration concluded by 
politicians may be regarded as beneficial for Europe-
an citizens, whereas others may reveal themselves as 
quite problematic.
In general, the aggravation of the financial crisis 
in the EU during the spring of 2010 has definitely 
raised the bar for European civic education because 
the didactic challenges to teach the sense of the EU 
have risen significantly. As the economic tensions 
between northern Europe (especially Germany) and 
southern Europe (especially Greece) have increased, 
cultural tensions have done also (e.g. Barysch 2010). 
“Are thrifty German taxpayers being exploited by lav-
ish Greeks?” “Are Greek citizens being oppressed by 
selfish German fiscal dictatorship?” Such questions 
may promote euroscepticism which already brought 
down the EU referenda in the Netherlands and France 
in 2005. This euroscepticism is not limited to poorly 
educated citizens, but can also be met among intel-
lectuals. The recent essay of the Dutch author Leon 
de Winter, who makes a passionate plea for the aboli-
tion of the euro, is a case in point (Winter 2010). Social 
science education would be very poorly advised to 
demonize or ignore such – politically incorrect, but 
intellectually stimulating – eurosceptic essays. Rather, 
the arguments of such texts have to be taken serious-
ly, should be openly discussed in class, and evaluated 
according to their merits and demerits as well as their 
truths, half-truths and untruths. These are the texts 
which can make social science education exciting and, 
of course, challenging.
This also means that the central goal of European 
civic education – promoting mutual understanding 
and respect between citizens from different Euro-
pean countries and cultures – can hardly be achieved 
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without economic education anymore: if the instruc-
tor ignores the economic tensions between the coun-
tries of the euro-zone or cannot explain their causes 
appropriately, the teaching becomes implausible or 
dilettantish. Scientific concepts like the theory of op-
timal currency areas have to be understood and used 
(in a simplified form, of course) “Optimum currency 
area issues are key to the situation.“ (Krugman 2010c). 
Simple, politically correct lesson plans merely calling 
for “European solidarity” or just celebrating the va-
riety of European peoples etc. alone will not master 
the challenge. In order to deal with simplistic, self-
serving nationalist prejudices as shown in tabloids, 
instructors need to be able to explain the economic 
tensions as a result of a certain, problematic institu-
tional configuration which can be reformed in two 
directions (Flassbeck, Spiecker 2010; Stiglitz 2010): ei-
ther in the direction of partial disintegration (ibidem, 
184; Scharpf 2010; Meyer 2010; Spethmann 2010) or in 
the direction of reinforced integration (ibidem, 183; 
Tilford 2010; Dullien, Schwarzer 2005). Social science 
education should point out these two possibilities 
and their respective advantages and disadvantages 
but should leave the informed choice to the prefer-
ences’ of the students.
Thus, European civic education has to become Euro-
pean economic education, too. It has to be discussed 
what are the problematic economic consequences 
of decisions which were strongly dominated by a 
political logic (e.g. furthering a European identity 
by introducing the euro) without taking care of eco-
nomic prerequisites. In a further step, it also has to 
be investigated what are the political repercussions 
of these economic consequences. Here, attention to 
counterintuitive side-effects is important, because 
the political repercussions may be the opposite of 
politicians’ original, well-intentioned motives (e.g. 
declining solidarity and mutual prejudices between 
(northern and southern) European citizens because of 
severe economic tensions produced by the euro, as f.e. 
some recent reports about allegedly “lavish” Greeks 
and “Nazi” Germans in Greek/German tabloids show). 
These tight relationships between European political 
and economic processes demonstrate the benefits of 
coordinating European civic and economic education.
1.5  The principal-agent problem of financial 
market regulation
The least one can conclude from the public debt 
problems of many leading Western countries is that 
one cannot rely on short-term Keynesian emergency 
measures once again when the next meltdown of the 
private financial sector occurs. Hence, it is decisive to 
implement far-sighted, long-term measures which are 
well suited to prevent or at least to mitigate the built-
up of new systemic risks in the financial sector of the 
private economy.
However, in stark contrast to the rather successful 
implementation of fiscal short-term measures, politi-
cians’ record concerning preventive long-term mea-
sures is rather disappointing up to date. According 
to Dullien and Herr (2010, 13), who have analyzed the 
current policy process of devising a new financial mar-
ket regulation in the EU, the proposals made by the 
team of experts convoked by the commission (the so-
called de Larosière-Group) are not only not sufficient, 
but are also being dramatically watered down by the 
commission and the council7. The same holds true for 
the upcoming financial reform bill in the US (e.g. Beck 
2010). 
“The US financial sector received an unconditional 
bailout – and is not now facing any kind of meaning-
ful re-regulation. We are setting ourselves up, without 
question, for another boom based on excessive and 
reckless risk-taking at the heart of the world’s finan-
cial system. This can end only one way: badly.“ (John-
son 2010)
Again, the failure of adequate re-regulation shows 
the necessity of a critical view on (US and European) 
politics in social science education.
The financial crisis itself was already a result of 
regulatory, i.e. political failure to the same extent as 
it was a result of market failure (Rajan 2010). Politics 
removed or failed to implement those regulatory in-
stitutions which are necessary to prevent (financial) 
markets from becoming self-destructive (Rothstein 
2009). Hence, it is important for civic and economic 
education to further the general insight that markets 
need a certain institutional embedding in order to 
protect and promote public welfare.
One important reason for the political failure to 
regulate financial markets appropriately was – be-
sides regulatory competition between countries and 
over-confidence of politicians in the supposedly self-
correcting forces of markets – lobbyism by actors 
out of the finance industry, as f.e. Johnson (2009) and 
Igan, Mishra, Tressel (2010) have shown. Consequently, 
an important task for interdisciplinary social science 
education at this point is to demonstrate the mecha-
nisms by which economic power is converted into po-
litical power (and vice versa).
The argument above shows – again – that citizens 
cannot rely on wise, diligent and benevolent poli-
ticians doing what is necessary to prevent the next 
financial crisis. Instead, they are confronted with a 
principal-agent problem, where the elected agent 
(politicians) is able to deviate from what is in the long-
term interest (i.e. prevention of crises) of the huge 
majority of the principal (citizenry). To be sure, this 
constellation is difficult to remedy, but one important 
reason for this problem is that many citizens lack even 
a basic understanding of which regulatory decisions 
7 See also the report in Der Spiegel 11/2010, 78 – 80.
Thorsten Hippe Journal of Social Science Education 
Exploring the Abyss – The Financial Crisis of 2008 ff. Volume 9, Number 1, 2010, pp. 5–19
11
concerning the financial sector would be in their long-
term interest. Instead, many angry citizens solely 
focus on psychological aspects like bankers’ ”greed”, 
on which politicians react by superficial and populist, 
but ineffective moral condemnation of bankers or 
by implementing merely symbolic policy measures8 
which aren’t very helpful to solve the main problems 
but instead divert attention from the real causes. So 
where should the prudent public pressure necessary to 
give politicians an incentive to implement more ap-
propriate measures come from?
Here lies one of the main reasons for educating citi-
zens about the financial crisis. Only knowledgeable 
citizens will be able, first of all, to recognize that ef-
fective prevention is primarily a matter of implement-
ing appropriate institutions (and not only of punishing 
personal moral failures). Only knowledgeable citizens 
will have the competence to adequately understand 
the causes of the crisis and – with the help of this 
background – to evaluate political proposals and mea-
sures which at least have the potential to mitigate 
future financial crises in order to give democratically 
accountable and elected politicians an incentive to 
implement more appropriate measures.
One could object to this line of reasoning that peo-
ple are not rational beings and often act as irrespon-
sibly as their political elites and that education can-
not change this pattern of behavior of the masses. Of 
course, social science education (especially because of 
its rather marginal status in the school curriculum of 
most countries) will not be able to turn all citizens 
into fully rational, politically interested and socially 
responsible beings who are willing to control all gov-
ernmental actions. But does this mean that social sci-
ence education should surrender to political fatalism? 
I do not think so.
Firstly, major governmental decisions in democ-
racies are influenced by public opinion and public 
awareness (see the empirical studies of Wlezien, Soro-
ka 2004, 2008; Hobolt, Klemmensen 2005, 381; Hobolt, 
Klemmensen 2008, 311). States with citizenries that 
regard attentiveness as a civic duty provide more ef-
fective governance (see the empirical study of Geissel 
(2008)). So, there is a good reason for social science 
education to try to educate public opinion and to 
raise public attentiveness as far as it is possible. Sec-
ondly, many citizens are willing and able to discuss, 
reflect – and then change – their political viewpoints 
in the light of scientific arguments (see the empirical 
studies of Fishkin, Luskin 2005, 290; Luskin, Fishkin, 
Hahn 2007). Many ordinary citizens are able to delib-
erate effectively even about technically complex po-
litical questions (see the empirical study of Warren & 
Pearse 2008). These empirical studies give no reason 
8 See f.e. http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article7006514/Trotz-
Bankenabgabe-zahlt-am-Ende-der-Buerger.html (04.05.2010)
to underestimate the potential effects of rational de-
liberation on humans’ minds. Thirdly, the majority 
of citizens do not vote irresponsibly in the sense of 
narrow self-interest, but vote according to what they 
regard as being in the general interest (Eichenberger, 
Oberholzer-Gee 1998; Kirchgässner, Feld, Savioz 1999; 
Frey 2005).
Of course, social science education may probably 
not alter the fact that a significant part of the citi-
zenry will remain politically apathetic. But there is no 
necessity to stimulate a deep political interest among 
all citizens. It is plausible that a critical mass of po-
litically interested and well-educated citizens is often 
sufficient to influence the public debate and political 
decisions effectively. So, can social science education 
really do nothing to induce motivational and cogni-
tive processes in a critical mass of learners’ brains 
which may increase their political interest, stimulate 
their will to inform themselves and make their politi-
cal opinion more scientifically informed concerning 
major political decisions (like f.e. the prevention / mit-
igation of future catastrophes in the financial sector)?
2.  Core concepts to understand the financial 
crisis
Two further educational objections could be raised 
against the argument so far. Firstly, it may lead to 
excessive demands on the intellectual capacities of 
learners, because the regulation of financial markets 
seems to be a very complicated matter. The learner 
may get bogged down in the intricate details of com-
plex financial products instead of understanding basic 
economic principles. Accordingly, pupils think that 
the financial crisis can only be understood by “ex-
perts”, as the investigation of Klee and Lutter (2010) 
shows. Secondly, even scientific experts seem to have 
quite different opinions about the ultimate causes of 
the crisis and the effective preventive countermea-
sures, so that it would be misleading to propose defi-
nite solutions.
2.1 Liability
However, both objections are not convincing. Of 
course, there are various scientific theories concern-
ing the financial crisis of 2008. However, they are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive and also do partly 
overlap. This overlap concerns a basic principle of the 
market economy which is not difficult to understand 
and therefore can be used to facilitate the learning 
process. For almost all scientific theories share the 
conviction – despite controversies concerning other 
arguments – that one important cause of the financial 
crisis was the violation of a basic principle of a func-
tioning, i.e. regulated market economy: liability (e.g. 
Theurl 2010; Sinn 2009; Baily, Elmendorf, Litan 2008; 
Hickel 2009; Roubini 2008; Reichmuth, Kappeler. Star-
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batty, Wagschal 2008; Borner, Bodmer 2010; Dullien, 
Herr, Kellermann 2009; Hellmeyer 2008).
Liability means that an actor has to take responsi-
bility for the economic consequences of his/her deci-
sions and the risks that he/she undertakes instead of 
passing the buck on someone else or the whole soci-
ety if things go wrong. Liability is a central pillar of a 
market economy functioning in the interest of public 
welfare because without it, economic actors would 
have no incentive to be economical, i.e. to prevent 
waste, to prevent unnecessary expenses, but also to 
be careful enough when considering risky decisions. 
Liability is an important concept for social science 
education because it is essential for understanding 
the institutional conditions under which economies 
perform well or poorly. Learners should understand 
the significance of liability because it is of great im-
portance for citizens’ quality of life in a society.
So, what has (missing) liability to do with the finan-
cial crisis of 2008?
Firstly, a lot of citizens in the US took out mort-
gages to buy houses despite the fact that they were 
unsure whether they would be able to pay it back in 
the future or even knew that they would not be able 
to pay it back out of their regular earnings. However, 
they could speculate, i.e. bet on (further) rising house 
prices which had increased continuously over the last 
15 years. With rising house prices, they would be able 
to sell the house, pay back the mortgage and take in 
the difference for themselves. Or they could increase 
the value of their mortgage and so could buy a new 
car or make a holiday. That was their potential gain. 
But what risk did the new home owners in the US in-
cur by taking out a mortgage? What would happen if 
house prices fell below the value of the mortgage and 
they were unable to pay back their credit? Would the 
bank have the right to take other property items of 
the borrowers or a part of their regular earnings in or-
der to offset the negative difference? No, not so in the 
US: the liability of the mortgage borrowers is severely 
limited there (which is different to many European 
countries). This situation of overly limited liability – 
“Heads I win, tails others (the lenders) lose” – gave 
borrowers an incentive to ignore the risks inherent in 
the housing market. This argument is also important 
to irritate the one-sided, populist stories of the finan-
cial crisis in which “greedy” bankers are the only cul-
prits. Hence, students’ and pupils’ conceptions of this 
kind, which are documented by the empirical investi-
gations of Klee and Lutter (2010) and Schuhen (2010), 
should be differentiated accordingly.
Secondly, local bankers in the US who sold (“origi-
nated”) mortgage loans knew that many borrowers 
would not be able to pay off their loans if house prices 
fell. Therefore, they did not want to have the credit 
on their own books and sold the mortgage credit on 
to larger US banks, who packaged them together un-
der the name of “asset backed securities” (ABS) and 
sold them on to other, often foreign banks (f.e. “stupid 
Germans from Düsseldorf” as one American investment 
banker expressed it9), which often had no clear idea of 
the risk which they had bought. Both the originating 
and the packaging banks in the US earned a fee for 
selling / packaging these credits, but did not have to 
bear any loss in the case that the loan would not be 
paid back. Thus, the liability of a second and third ac-
tor, i.e. those of the originating and packaging banks 
for the risks of the housing market was also severely 
limited, which gave them an incentive to sell and pack-
age as many mortgages as possible (in order to earn 
fees) without checking the creditworthiness of the 
borrowers appropriately. This argument is important 
to deepen pupils’ understanding of the crises and to 
steer their focus from actors’ moral failures towards 
institutional issues. As Klee and Lutter (2010) show, 
pupils only understand that banks made bad loans, 
but they do not reasonably explain why banks acted 
this way. It was not only because of “irresponsible 
business behavior”, as the pupils express it, but also 
because of certain institutions a) which gave those 
banks who originated the loans self-interest in doing 
so and b) which deceived those banks who bought 
the “asset backed securities” (ABS). The latter will be 
shown in the following paragraph.
Thirdly, credit rating agencies gave ABS good credit 
ratings despite the fact that the packages consisted 
of dubious loans. In order to understand this seeming 
contradiction, one must know that the credit rating 
agencies are paid for their work (giving grades) by the 
banks who wanted to sell the ABS. One can draw an 
analogy between this actor constellation and a (fic-
tive) situation where a teachers’ salary would be de-
pendent upon (conditional) payments by the parents 
of their pupils in his class. It is not too difficult to 
imagine what the effect on the grades would be. Now, 
what has this to do with liability? Under current law, 
credit rating agencies do not have to fear lawsuits by 
investors who relied on the agencies’ grades in good 
faith and therefore bought the ABS, but had to bear 
the losses. This means that credit rating agencies do 
not have to assume any legal liability for giving too 
“rosy” grades which deceive investors10. Thus, the li-
ability of a fourth actor (credit rating agencies) was 
severely limited, which also gave them an incentive to 
overlook the risks of ABS.
9 See the article “Stupid Germans”. In: Wirtschaftswoche 26th 
april 2010, page 81-86.
10 See Mauro Bussani (2009): Credit Rating Agencies. The Accoun-
tability Challenge. In OECD: The Global Standard Blog. htt-
ps://community.oecd.org/community/gcls/blog/2009/07/07/
credit-rating-agencies-the-accountability-challenge and 
Tho mas Straubhaar (2010): Why rating agencies should 
be flogged. http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unterneh-
men/0,1518,692607,00.html (06.05.2010)
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Fourthly, Klee and Lutter (2010) show that pupils’ 
actor concept of “banks” (and probably of corpora-
tions in general) is not differentiated enough to ex-
plain the behavior of those banks who bought the 
bad loans. Instead of just talking about “banks”, one 
has to differentiate between three actors to fully un-
derstand the dynamics of the system: bank managers, 
bank owners (i.e. shareholders = mostly investment 
funds) and the customers of the investment funds. 
The consideration of the latter group means that – as 
also Deutschmann (2010) stresses – ordinary people 
and not only “greedy bankers” are also (indirectly) 
involved in the mess. This is especially important 
because the public discourse focuses way too much 
on “greedy” bank managers with their bonuses while 
neglecting the role of the shareholders (investment 
funds and their customers).
Banks bought ABS because their shareholders – i.e. 
investment funds who had bought bank stocks – ex-
pected or even urged the banks’ managers to pur-
sue high yielding investment strategies. Of course, 
every financial expert should know that investment 
products with higher returns also have a higher risk. 
However, the shareholders (i.e. investment funds) of 
the banks nevertheless pressurized bank managers 
to achieve returns as high as possible regardless of 
the risks associated with such a strategy. Why did / 
could shareholders (i.e. investment funds) neglect the 
risk? Again, the reason is overly limited liability (in 
this case of the shareholders, i.e. investment funds). 
Sinn (2009, 83ff.) argues that the liability of the banks’ 
shareholders was limited much too strongly because 
they have to bear only a very small part of the losses 
potentially associated with the risky business strate-
gies of the banks whereas they would reap all of the 
huge potential gains (see also Rajan 2010, 147f. and 
Fox 2010). Shareholders’ liability was (and is) overly 
limited because the so-called “core capital” of the 
banks (which can be understood as a contingency 
fund for the case of severe losses), which the owners 
(i.e. the shareholders = investment funds) have to pay 
in, was much too low. Thus, for the shareholder, the 
situation was like “Heads we make huge profits, tails 
other creditors (or in the end, the tax-payer) will bear 
the bulk of the losses.” Instead of bolstering the con-
tingency funds adequately, shareholders urged bank 
managers to reduce the contingency funds as much as 
possible and to pay out as much money as possible to 
them (via dividends, share buy-backs etc.).
A further reason why investment funds neglect(ed) 
the risks, which also refers to the category of liabil-
ity, is put forward by Windolf (2008). He argues that 
(the managers of the) investment funds are “owners 
without risks”, i.e. owners of corporations (f.e. banks) 
who have bought their shares and therefore have the 
right and capacity to influence the business strategy 
of these corporations (especially by demanding busi-
ness strategies with high returns regardless of the 
risks). This influence is mediated by “voice” (direct de-
mands) and/or “exit/entry” (selling shares of corpora-
tions who do not fulfill their claims and buying those 
of others who do). At the same time however, it is not 
the managers of the funds themselves who bear the 
risks of their own demands: the investment fund man-
agers bear no liability for their risky business strate-
gies. Instead, it is the customers of the investment 
funds who have to bear potential losses (caused by 
overly risky business strategies) which manifest them-
selves in declining share prices. 
One could object to this argument that custom-
ers would not accept such risks and would choose 
those investment funds whose managers do not de-
mand risky business strategies from the corporations 
in which they invest. However, this is not the case. 
Firstly, because of information asymmetries between 
the funds’ managers and their customers, the latter 
have hardly any idea about the demands (and their 
riskiness) which investment funds place on corpora-
tions. In contrast to that, they can rather easily evalu-
ate the short-to-medium return of the funds, so that 
they choose investment funds mainly according to 
this criterion – and this gives the investment funds, 
who are in fierce competition, an incentive to focus on 
maximizing returns, regardless of what this means for 
(long-term) risks. Secondly, investment funds conceal 
these risks to customers by arguing that they would 
reduce risk by global diversification (which most cus-
tomers find convincing). To be sure, this claim – seen 
individually – is true, but concerns a completely dif-
ferent kind of risk which has nothing to do with the 
risk which is produced by demanding skyrocketing 
returns between 15% and 25% or even more from cor-
porations (among them banks). The latter risk is not 
reduced by global diversification at all because most 
investment funds demand such skyrocketing returns 
from all corporations regardless of whether they oper-
ate in America, Europe, Asia or Africa.11
Besides the liability issue, learners can see here 
again that the financial crisis is not only a problem of 
“greedy bankers”, as Deutschmann (2010) points out:
“Without the often naive quest of millions of small 
investors for maximum profits the business of the in-
vestment funds, even their existence, would not have 
been possible. (…) It seems that the “terror” of the 
economy, being so vividly complained in certain mid-
dle class milieus, goes back to a considerable degree 
to the well developed financial instincts of the very 
middle class individuals themselves. In other words, it 
is not farfetched to assume that the often complained 
11 A recent case study to illustrate the whole argument can be 
found here: http://www.blicklog.com/2010/04/30/eine-ur-
sache-der-finanzkrise-macht-durch-kritik-an-der-credit-suisse-
deutlich/ (6th may 2010)
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negative phenomena of financial capitalism may be 
interpreted partly as the unintended collective result 
of individual investor action.”
Thus, by understanding the problematic conse-
quences which result from the intense competition 
between the investment funds and their pressure on 
the managers of banks/corporations, learners can also 
see possible advantages of different kind of funds 
which pursue ethical / socially responsible investment 
(SRI) strategies instead of maximizing (short-to-medi-
um-term) profits at all cost. Learners should at least 
realize that there are alternative economic criteria to 
judge investment options (see f.e. the lesson plan of 
Kaiser 2010).
The four examples given above illustrate the impor-
tance of the concept liability for teaching about the 
financial crisis. Further important examples like lim-
iting the liability of banks by bailing them out with 
tax-payers’ money, and the potential consequences of 
the resulting “too-big-to-fail”-mentality of the banks 
– even more risky behavior in the future – could be 
easily invoked (Rajan 2010, 148ff.). Unfortunately, the 
concept of liability plays no role in pupils’ explana-
tion of the financial crisis who were interviewed by 
Klee and Lutter (2010) and in the explanations given 
by the majority of the students who were surveyed by 
Schuhen (2010). Thus, social science education should 
introduce learners to this basic concept in order to 
deepen their understanding of the causes of the crisis.
This is especially important because the concept 
of liability is not only a special tool for understand-
ing the financial crisis, but is of general importance 
for economic education, because this concept can 
be applied to a lot of other economic contexts in 
order to understand a range of important problems 
and phenomenon. One central example for such a 
phenomenon is the relative economic success of the 
regulated market economies in Western Europe up to 
1989 compared to the misery and collapse of state so-
cialism in Eastern Europe. The theory of “soft budget 
constraints” (which can be expressed as “missing li-
ability”) developed by Kornai (1992) has shown that 
the “soft budget constraints” of state corporations 
in Eastern Europe, i.e. their missing liability for eco-
nomic losses (which were always offset by the state) 
was a central source of the waste and inefficiency as 
well as the resulting scarcity of goods and services 
and their often poor quality which were characteristic 
for the economies in Eastern Europe until 1989. Thus, 
this example, too, shows how important the concept 
of liability is for understanding the fundaments of 
citizens’ economic quality of life.
This example, i.e. the relative success of (former) 
Western market economies with (formerly) strict lia-
bility regulation compared to the fate of Eastern state 
economies without liability regulation is also of direct 
importance with regard to the conclusions one draws 
from the financial crisis. For it prevents the learner to 
throw the baby out with the bath water, i.e. to think 
that markets resp. the market economy as such are re-
sponsible for the financial crisis and to conclude that 
the alleged “chaos” of the market should be better re-
placed by (allegedly far-sighted) state planning. A sig-
nificant part of pupils (round about one third) at least 
in Germany – especially in East Germany – indeed 
think about the economy in this way (Deutz-Schröder, 
Schröder 2008). Hence, social science education needs 
the concept of liability to convincingly show that such 
claims have no scientific basis, i.e. that crisis preven-
tion is not achieved by the abolition of markets but by 
the right kind of market regulation (and maybe also – 
as some scientific theories (see below) argue – by con-
taining social inequalities and/or pursuing a different 
kind of monetary policy.)
Unfortunately, despite its huge importance for the 
economic quality of life of a society, the concept of 
liability has not been recognized in current educa-
tional standards of economic education at all (see the 
overview in Weber 2005). This is a grave deficit which 
should be remedied.
2.2  Inequality
Of course, this is not to say that the financial crisis can 
be solely explained by the concept of liability. Other 
scientific theories suggest two further causes of the 
crisis, which, however, are more contested in the so-
cial sciences than the issue of liability. Both of these 
two causes are key issues of social science education 
for a long time, so that a discussion of the financial 
crisis can be easily coupled to core components of cur-
rent lesson plans.
On the one hand, some authors (e.g. Taylor 2009) 
argue that the monetary policy pursued by the FED in 
the US after 2001 was much too lax, so that low inter-
est rates induced too many citizens to take out mort-
gages which they could not afford in the long-term.
On the other hand, other authors (e.g. Rajan 2010; 
Dullien, Herr, Kellermann 2009) argue that the lax 
monetary policy pursued by the FED was the political 
consequence of rising social inequality, a very thin so-
cial safety-net and therefore rising social insecurity in 
the US. This has put the FED and (short-sighted) poli-
ticians in the US government under intense political 
pressure to ensure widespread access to easy credit 
(as a political palliative) and to keep the economy 
booming at all cost (Rajan 2010). Two measures were 
applied to achieve this.
Firstly, the FED, which was (and is) under pressure 
by Congress politicians (Rajan 2010) and whose for-
mal independence is already undermined by close in-
formal connections to the US government (Hellmeyer 
2008), held the interest rate at a very low level for a 
very long time (which triggered the house price infla-
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tion and animated the financial sector to seek risky 
assets with higher return expectations).
Secondly, US politicians used two large govern-
ment-sponsored private enterprises, known as Fannie 
and Freddie (which had to be rescued by the govern-
ment in 2008), and the Community Reinvestment 
Act to enhance home-ownership among poor people 
by legally requiring these two enterprises and local 
banks to allocate increasing quotas of their funding to 
mortgage loans to poor people (subprime mortgages) 
(Rajan 2010, 34ff.). Thereby, the delusive vision of an 
“ownership society”, which was built on unsustainable 
subprime credit, became the substitute for an effec-
tive social policy. “Subprime mortgage lending was the 
symptom, dwindling economic opportunity for many the 
cause.”(Rajan 2010, 183) So, these authors place special 
emphasis on social inequality as an important reason 
of the financial crisis.
According to the Postkeynesian view (e.g. Dullien, 
Herr, Kellermann 2009; Horn et al. 2009; Sapir 2009), 
the strong increase of social inequality in almost all 
Western countries in the last two decades has made 
the Western economy vulnerable to the macroeco-
nomic problem of insufficient demand, because 
higher income groups save a relatively high fraction 
of their income, whereas lower income groups spend 
a relatively high fraction or even all of their earned 
money. Normally, this situation would have resulted in 
(very) weak economic growth. However, this problem 
was temporarily compensated in the US and UK by a 
massive increase of debt in the private household sec-
tor (especially in poor households), which increased 
economic demand and thereby created jobs. „The US 
economy maintained a high rate of economic growth by 
substituting (mortgage) credit for labor income.“ (Sapir 
2009)
In continental Europe, the problem of insufficient 
demand (and unemployment) was more severe be-
cause it was not accompanied (because of cultural rea-
sons and more stringent regulation of bank lending) 
by rising indebtedness of the private sector as in the 
US. However, even here the problem was mitigated 
(especially in Germany) by an export boom (made pos-
sible by wage moderation). But this export boom was 
made possible by the debt-financed boom in countries 
like the US, the UK, Spain etc.
Hence, according to this theory, rising and un-
sustainable indebtedness has concealed a distribu-
tional problem of financial capitalism for some time, 
which may not only be regarded as problematic seen 
from social justice, but which also creates macro-
economic dysfunctions. So, these authors – as does 
Deutschmann in this issue – call for policy measures 
which contain rising inequality and which reduce the 
addiction of some countries either to exports (e.g. 
Germany) or to debt (e.g. the US), like f.e. higher tax 
rates for high earnings, a universal health care system 
(in the US), improving access to quality education for 
pupils of lower income groups etc. Of course, some 
of these policy measures as well as the theory behind 
it are disputed by other social scientists who regard 
missing liability and/or lax monetary policy as sole 
causes.
But even if we recognize that the role of inequality 
as a structural cause of the financial crisis is contest-
ed, it can and should be openly and controversially 
discussed in social science education. The argument 
makes clear how fruitful it is for civic and economic 
education to transgress traditional disciplinary 
boundaries by combining and interrelating “sociolog-
ical” concepts (social inequality), “political” mecha-
nisms (politicians’ search for immediate, short-sight-
ed popular support and legitimacy), and “economic” 
issues (monetary policy).
Moreover, the arguments of liability and inequality 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive but can comple-
ment each other (all authors who put special empha-
sis on inequality also do recognize the importance of 
liability, see f.e. Dullien, Herr, Kellermann 2009; Rajan 
2010). Unfortunately, the term of inequality is com-
pletely absent in pupils’ explanation of the crisis, as 
the interviews of Klee and Lutter (2010) show. This is 
not very surprising as it plays hardly any role in media 
stories covering the financial crisis. Thus, in order to 
deepen and to differentiate students’ understanding 
of the crisis, the role of inequality as a possible cause 
of the crisis should be discussed in schools and uni-
versities.
3.  Conclusion
Social science education in schools and universities 
should enable learners to understand the causes of 
contemporary global key problems like f.e. the fi-
nancial crisis, which threaten citizens’ quality of life. 
Learners should examine and debate controversial 
approaches as to what they can do as individuals 
and groups on a micro- and meso-level (f.e. socially 
responsible investing) as well as to what can be done 
politically on a macro-level to mitigate global key 
problems and to overcome the political barriers which 
currently stand in the way of effective measures. This 
problem-centered conception of social science educa-
tion (Hippe 2010) starts from the premise that social 
science – which is financed by citizens’ money – is not 
a pure end in itself (a l’art pour l’art), but an institu-
tion which should help the public to identify those 
societal institutions which are conducive to citizens’ 
quality of life or which at least says something about 
how to mitigate social misery.
Unfortunately, as Ötsch and Kappeler (2010) rightly 
criticize (see also Frey 2000, 25ff.), this problem-cen-
tered approach is currently far from being the domi-
nant way of academic teaching (even not in the sci-
entific part of teacher education). Instead, scientific 
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models, theories and concepts are often taught and 
pursued as ends in themselves (Ötsch and Kappeler 
2010; Frey 2000) – may they provide useful informa-
tion for politically concerned citizens or not. Central 
questions like “Why is it important for me as a citizen 
to know this kind of model or that sort of concept? 
Why should citizens provide the financial means to do 
this kind of social research?” are often not answered 
(if not ridiculed). Thus, is it really completely mislead-
ing if some citizens (and students) think of universi-
ties as “ivory towers”?
According to Peter Grimes (quoted in Ötsch and 
Kappeler 2010), the reason for this pedagogic misery 
is that it is much more time-consuming for the scien-
tist to prepare courses if one teaches in a problem-
centered manner than if one teaches in the traditional 
way (explaining the same old models, concepts, theo-
ries of the usual textbooks again and again). At the 
same time, research output is much more important 
for promoting decisions than is excellent teaching. 
So there is a large incentive for the social scientist to 
concentrate on research and to do only what is neces-
sary in teaching. For example, it is much easier and 
time-saving to do an introductory course in New In-
stitutional Economics by just giving a summary of 
one or two corresponding textbooks (f.e. Erlei et. al. 
2008; Richter, Furubotn 2006) than to do such a course 
by showing students how central concepts of New In-
stitutional Economics can be applied to elucidate cur-
rent problems like the financial crisis, the crisis of the 
euro etc. and to find possible solutions for them.
Hence, it is not so surprising that even the ad-
vanced students of economics/social sciences sur-
veyed by Schuhen (2010) show rather disappointing 
results concerning the causes of the financial crisis. 
Effective teaching of global key problems like the fi-
nancial crisis in universities presupposes that excel-
lent teaching, which is relevant and meaningful for 
real-world problems, will be put on an equal footing 
with research output in promoting decisions. Other-
wise, all those formidable theoretical conceptions of 
social science education who want to empower citi-
zens to defend their legitimate economic and politi-
cal interests will often remain not much more than 
wishful thinking.
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